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Wednesday, March 7, 2007

Judges-Greylord-Libby-Guilty

MAR6TH 2007 LIBBY CONVICTED Libby Found Guilty in CIA Leak Case - washingtonpost.com

Prosecutors Say The Prosecutors Say They Felt Pressured, Threatened Hill Republicans, Justice Dept. Cited

Dan Eggen and Paul Kane
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, March 7, 2007; Page A01

Six fired U.S. attorneys testified on Capitol Hill yesterday that they had separately been the target of complaints, improper telephone calls and thinly veiled threats from a high-ranking Justice Department official or members of Congress, both before and after they were abruptlyy Felt Pressured, Threatened - washingtonpost.com

,

Triggers 4th AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE AGAINST FEDERAL JUDGE JAMES ROSENBAUM AffPrejud, unabated by the System for

Motion for ReconsiderationBased

Affidavit of Prejudice/Recusals

filed 27Feb07 unsigned?



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
MINNESOTA
06-cv-01607

Eighth Circuit Court Appeals

No.06-2779

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Sharon Anderson aka Peterson-Scarrella

Attorney Pro Se, Private AG et al

*

CIVIL ACTION NO.

NO.06-2779(8th)

Relator-Respondant-Appellant*
VERSUS*
*

US of America, all Agencies,State of Minnesota,All Agencies, County of

Ramsey, City of St.Paul, Mayor Chris Coleman et al, Water Board et al

*
Defendant*Federal Judge James Rosenbaum
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Relator-Appellant- MOTION AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM FOR
RECUSAL, AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO AMEND
JUDGMENT, AND/OR MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE

COMES NOW THE Relator-Whistleblower-victim www.sharonanderson.org submits this 4th Motion for Recusal, and, In the Alternative, to Amend Judgment and/or Motion For New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.

I. POSTURE OF THE CASE

Sharon has previously filed a Motion for Recusal in all case's. in the past 30 years re: Memorandumn e-commerce below. Motion's were denied by Order entered on in file. The denial of Sharons Motion for Recusal was appealed to the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court. The denial of the Motion for Recusal was upheld by the appellate courts,

Pursuant to FRCP 59(b), this Motion is served within 14 days of entry of Judgment.

Sharon Anderson seeks recusal of the Honorable Judge James Rosenbaum, and, in the alternative, an amendment of the judgment to reinstate our claims of retaliation and defamation,complicity to deny Attorney Pro Se's, Private Attorney Generals,Candidates for Public Office of State Attorney General re: Separation of Powers, Theft by Swindle of all our realestate matters, for the past 30 years. Denial of Access to Seats of Government, Jury Trials.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of this Motion to Amend Judgment and/or Motion for New Trial is the same standard of review as that of a motion for summary judgment.

Judgment as a matter of law is proper where "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [a] party." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(a)(1). Of course, "we view the entire trial record in the light most favorable to the non-movant, drawing reasonable inferences in its favor." Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 1997).

We test the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard enunciated in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled on unrelated grounds, Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), which is the same standard the district court employs. See Atkin v. Lincoln Property Co., 991 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1993). Under Boeing, "[t]here must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question." 411 F.2d at 375. Substantial evidence is "evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions." Id. at 374; see also Krystek v. University of Southern Mississippi, 164 F.3d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1999).

III. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION

Relator-Appelle filed a motion for recusal early on in this case. The motion was denied on re: scrool down to docket sheet.

IV. RECUSAL IS REQUIRED IN THIS CASE

Because Judge Rosenbaum lied to Congress: is receiving compensation and prestige/pension's, complicity to defraud the US:in a "Patterened Enterprise (RICO) HE must/ should recuse himself.


"Under 28 U.S.C. §455(a), a justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States is required to recuse himself 'in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned'." Id. Subsection (b) of that same section further requires that he recuse himself in other specified circumstances.

Under 28 U.S.C. §455(b), he shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: "(4) He knows that he . . . has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding . . . "
On the Graves of our heritage these State & Federal Judges must implore the Wrath of God, and the Citizenery of the United States. Bernice Peterson EEOC
73USPetJudgeGrittnerJud89.jpg (image)

42741-321stplGunLake_01HearingHUD v. City St. Paul/2001-0791.resp.pdf

Sharon-Minnesota Homegrown Mora,MN Peterson Heritage Love Minnesota1984+Tax+Court.jpg (image) CrimComplaint v Judges 05_41

C4-85-1848+PubAccesSC+018.jpg (image)

Sample Memoranudm www.judicialwatch.org for financial disclosures

Not only does the teaching position come with a stipend of $5500.00 that can be spent in any manner, the position itself is one of prestige. The followinImpeachments_1992.jpg (image)g Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have taught at the Tulane Law School Summer School Abroad program:

Justice Antonin Scalia - 1987, 1991, 1997;

Justice Harry Blackmun - 1992;

Chief Justice William Rehnquist - 1995, 1997;

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg - 1999

In Health Services Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit observed that "[t]he goal of the disqualification statute is to promote public confidence in the judicial system by avoiding even the appearance of partiality. Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983). In particular, Section 455(a) was intended to establish an objective test so that "disqualification should follow if the reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). See also Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1979). Judicial Finan.Disc.

Chief (MN)Judge James Rosenbaum when faced with the recusal issues prior to June, 2002, decided that, in his view, there was no impartiality and no appearance of impartiality. However, the proper question is whether a reasonable person who knows all of the circumstances would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. Under the proper standard, and with the latest facts of his complicity with Bank of America, FDIC: Laws & Regulations www.billdahn.blogspot.com256 Morton Dahn Homestead, Bill BrotherDahnFedWritOrder_6 Diabetic Prisoner
US Dist. 02-0332 further complicity with Chief Justice Russell Anderson, who;s authority is in question as he did not stand Election 2006 Sharon has been denied her property at 42741-321st Pl (GunLake) Aitkin MN for over 5 years, Murder of her husband and Tenant,PropertyTaxsPaid1977CourtFilesQuietTitles,EquitySkimming,FraudulentConveyancesears,MN Bull to act in concort/treason with the Health Care of the Citizenery mainframed in France, ie: Murder of www.cpljimanderson.blogspot.com Buck Lake and Crow-Wing Propertys: re: US Dist 1258Sharon's property rights.1058SummitDuplex
325 N.Wilder 6unit448Desnoyer Duplex 2194MarshallDuplex 697 SurreySingleFamily

1/3 309Pelham all personal property including 94 Peterbilt.

The judge can himself decide whether the claim asserted is within Section 455. If he decides that it is, then a disinterested judge must decide what the facts are. See 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3550 (1984) and the cases cited there.

A review of recusal cases supports the conclusion that Judge Rosenbaum or any Licensed Lawyer Judge ie: In re Scarrella for Associate Justice 221NW2d562 should recuse herself. C4-85-1848+PubAccesSC+018.jpg (image)

The circumstances of the Levitt case that were not sufficient for recusal of the judge are that the judge's wife was a student at the university defendant; the judge received his degrees from the university defendant; the judge's prior law firm has done business with the university defendant; judge was a member of Phi Beta Kappa and an issue in the case was the falsification of Phi Beta Kappa credentials; timing of judge's rulings; and a comment of the judge's law clerk. Barbara W. Levitt V. University of Texas at El Paso, et al., 847 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1988).

In the case at bar, Judge Rosenbaum wife Marlyn Hennipin Co. Judge, now with former US Attorney Robert Small complicit with Federal Judge Ann Montgomery, US Attorney Lonnie Bryon 42 USC 3631PACERCM/ECFVA Widow's USDist97-1258(Montgomerys)Abuse_Denial 1stREdress

The legislative history indicates that Section 455(a) was meant to lessen the traditional "duty to sit," and, as the Supreme Court has indicated, to require avoidance of even the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860- 61, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202-03, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). Recusal may be required even in the absence of actual partiality if there is an objectively reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality. Id.; see Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 (1973) ("[A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.") (emphasis supplied).

The proper standard for ascertaining whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under Section 455(a) is whether the charge of lack of impartiality is grounded on facts that would create a reasonable doubt, not in the mind of the judge, or even necessarily that of the litigant, but rather in the mind of the reasonable person. See United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 1181, 51 L.Ed.2d 585 (1977).

Section 455(a) requires a contextual, case-by-case analysis. Weighing all the factors in the present case, a reasonable person viewing all the circumstances would question the impartiality of the judge. Therefore, Judge Berrigan should recuse herself.

The Eleventh Circuit case of Dr. Kathleen Johnson Wu, et al. v. Joab Thomas, University of Alabama Board of Trustees, et al., (11th Cir. 1993), considered whether a judge with ties to a university should recuse himself in a case against the university.

In denying plaintiffs' recusal motion, Judge Guin noted that he receives no salary as an adjunct professor and that his duties are limited to letting law students intern in federal court and judicial chambers for one semester. He also wrote that he has not donated money to the University for many years.

On these facts, the Eleventh Circuit held that no reasonable observer would question Judge Guin's impartiality. The case at bar is distinguished from the

A judge's "background and associations" do not justify recusal. United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987). However, Judge Rosenbaums complicity with US Attorneys, lying to Congress goes far beyond that.

allow an impartial judge to preside over this case.

V. TO EXPAND THE MATTERN HOLDING IS TO IGNORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULING IN ROBINSON, TO IGNORE THE CASE LAW IN OTHER CIRCUITS ON THIS ISSUE, AND TO IGNORE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE

In the alternative, if Judge Rosenbaum does not recuse herself, Sharon moves this Honorable Court to amend its Judgment in this case and reinstate ALL CASES FOR 30 YEARS FOR TRIAL ADJUTICIATION AND retaliation and defamation claims.

This Honorable Court has erred in its holding that Title VII does Bernice Peterson EEOCnot protect a former employee from a negative reference letter by a former employer if that negative reference letter is motivated by retaliation for participation in a protected activity. This Court admits that the Fifth Circuit has not addressed this issue. However, in attempting to stretch the language of the Mattern case to cover the negative reference letter this Court ignores the U.S. Supreme Court case of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), ignores cases that have addressed this particular issue in other circuits, and ignores the plain language of the civil rights laws. Under this Court's ruling, an ex-employee would have little or no protection from a former employer issuing retaliatory negative reference letters. Under this Court's ruling the only cause of action for a retaliatory negative reference letter would be to prove (1) retaliatory animus of the former employer and (2) that the ex-employee was not hired by the potential new employer because of the negative reference letter. This would be a near impossible to prove because an employer can invent tens of reasons why it did not hire someone. Under this Court's ruling, retaliatory black balling of former employees would be a violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions in the sense that the United States Supreme Court has held. Appellants Mother Bernice stuck up for the Black Women Lisa Springfield the reprisals were pervase/fatal leading to Death.Bernice Peterson EEOC

In Robinson, the United States Supreme Court reversed a Fourth Circuit decision and held that a former employee does have the protection of Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions. In that case, while an EEOC charge was pending, the ex-employee applied for a job with another company, which contacted the employee's ex-employer for an employment reference. Claiming that ex-employer gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge, the ex-employee filed suit under §704(a) of Title VII, which makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections. In deciding this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is a cause of action for a negative job reference given by an ex-employer who gives the negative reference in retaliation for the ex-employee exercising his rights under Title VII. The Supreme Court could have, but did not, make a ruling that negative job references are not adverse employment actions. By not making that ruling, this Court is bound not to make that ruling.

Other than ignoring the clear intent of the U.S. Supreme Court in this area of the law, this Court ignores the rulings in the other circuits, that have specifically ruled on this issue.

In Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1997) the Ninth Circuit held that the dissemination of a negative job reference constituted retaliation. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that tangible economic loss is not an essential element of a Title VII retaliation claim. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1997). In Hashimoto, the Ninth Circuit held that a " 'personnel action' motivated by retaliatory animus" creates liability under Title VII regardless of whether that action would warrant the award of remedies. Id. Thus, giving a poor job reference to a prospective employer may constitute an adverse employment action even if the reference was not material in the employee not getting the job. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that such an interpretation was necessary to uphold the purposes of Title VII. Id. In Hashimoto, both the EEOC and the district court found that Hashimoto's supervisor, Lowery, gave her a negative reference in retaliation for her filing an EEOC complaint for race and gender discrimination. The Court noted that the dissemination of the adverse job reference violated Title VII because it was a "personnel action" motivated by retaliatory animus. Id., at 676. Thus, it was irrelevant that Lowery's dissemination of the negative job reference was not the reason Hashimoto was denied the job she applied for.

Moreover, disclosure of the fact that plaintiff had filed an EEOC complaint against RTC could be considered an adverse action for purposes of his retaliation claim. Certainly a potential employer might think twice about hiring someone after finding out that he had filed charges against his previous employer. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 894 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for former employer on plaintiff's claim that defendant retaliated against him by informing placement firm that plaintiff had filed EEOC charge against defendant); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1977) (act of plaintiff's former employer in informing potential employer that plaintiff had filed sex discrimination charge against defendant was an act of retaliation in violation of Title VII); Czarnowski v. Desoto, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 1252, 1259 (N.D.Ill.1981) (former employer's informing potential employer that plaintiff had filed EEOC complaint against former employer painted plaintiff as "a disgruntled employee or 'troublemaker,' " and constituted retaliation in violation of Title VII); see also Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978) (former employer's refusal to give plaintiff referral letters, if intended as retaliation against plaintiff for having filed EEOC charge, violates Title VII).
MEMORANDUMN THE BERNOFSKY CASE IS HEREWITH USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES

This is exactly the fact situation of the case at bar. The potential employer did not consider hiring Bernofsky because of the retaliatory disclosure by Tulane that he had sued Tulane and that he had sued the head of his department personally, which is "technically inaccurate." However, when the fact that the author of the letter is an attorney completely familiar with the case, the technical inaccuracy has a ring of retaliatory animus.

In Hashimoto, the Court held that the Plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether RTC took action against plaintiff in retaliation for his having filed an EEOC complaint. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim was denied.

This Court should make the same ruling by denying Tulane's motion for summary judgment because Bernofsky has adduced sufficient evidence to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Tulane took action against him in retaliation for his filing his EEOC complaint and discrimination lawsuit.

In addition to making a ruling in this case that ignores judicial precedent, this Court's ruling that expands the holding in Mattern also ignores the language of Title VII, as it has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.

Under Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII, an employer who "otherwise ... discriminate[s]" with respect to the "terms" or "conditions" of employment on account of an illicit classification is subject to Title VII liability. It is well established that Title VII bars discrimination not only in the "terms" and "conditions" of ongoing employment, but also in the "terms" and "conditions" under which individuals may obtain employment. See, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-36, 91 S.Ct. 849, 854-56, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (facially neutral educational and testing requirements that are not reasonable measures of job performance and have disparate impact on hiring of minorities violate Title VII). Thus, for example, a requirement of preemployment health examinations imposed only on female employees, or a requirement of preemployment background security checks imposed only on black employees, would surely violate Title VII.

This would be the case even though the extra requirement had not caused any of the employees not to be hired. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997).

EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1989) held that unlawful personnel action that "turn[s] out to be inconsequential goes to the issue of damages, not liability".

Smith v. Secretary of Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981) held that "an illegal act of discrimination whether based on race or some other factor such as a motive of reprisal is a wrong in itself under Title VII, regardless of whether that wrong would warrant an award of [damages].".

This Court has stated that the First, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the restricted view of the Fifth Circuit in identifying an adverse employment action as an action with with an immediate economic effect on the employee. There is only one circuit, the Eighth that agrees with the Fifth Circuit on this issue. Also the DC Circuit has rejected the Fifth Circuit view. However, neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit has addressed the issue of a retaliatory negative reference letter. Bernofsky has cited in this brief cases from the Second, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and DC Circuits, all of which have held that there is a cause of action for retaliation under Title VII for a retaliatory reference letter, whether or not that letter was a factor in the non hiring of the ex-employee. What this Court lacks in its opinion is case law (the Fifth Circuit has not addressed this issue) that supports its holding that, in the instance of a retaliatory negative reference letter, the relevant adverse employment action is the prospective employer's failure to hire and not the issuance of the letter.

VI. SHARON ANDERSON HAS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS TO SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE RETALIATION AND DEFAMATION CLAIMS,COMPLICITY,CASE FIXING BY THE FEDERAL JUDGE ROSENBAUM.

Even if this Court holds that the relevant Separation of Powers, Civil Rights Claims do not have Civil Jurisdiction then the Criminal Action must be Investigated.

Q. You can't guarantee to us that
Dr. Bernofsky would have been hired at
Houston?

A. No. I couldn't guarantee that.
That is a committee decision. But what I
meant -- I use that word very carefully --
"was a good candidate." What I meant was
Carl would have made a good candidate,
meaning that he would have made a good
choice.

Very often in searches you get
many people who are not good candidates. In
the case of Dr. Bernofsky, I thought that he
would make a good candidate, meaning that he
could certainly have made the short list.

Q. If the good candidates make the
short list --

A. He certainly would have made the
short list.

Q. This position, this tenure track
position that you say you were hoping that
you could find for him, would that involve
teaching duties as well as research duties?

A. Yes.

Q. That is teaching undergraduate or
graduates, or both?

A. Undergraduates.

This is as much proof as any prospective employee could have that a negative reference letter prevented him from getting employment. The negative reference will prevent a prospective employee from getting an interview with the short list of candidates. Without being interviewed, it is impossible to state that any prospective employee would have been hired but for the negative reference letter.

The University of Houston had open positions that Bernofsky qualified for at the time of Beal's negative reference letter. Wolinsky testified on page 16:

Q. Now, at the time that you received
his inquiry, were there possibilities at the
University of Houston for a position for
Dr. Bernofsky?

A . Yes, there were.

Q. Would you describe what
possibilities were available at that time?

A. First of all, there were not only
positions available in my department, but
positions on campus. A person like Carl in
that field could look for and seek and find
employment in any number of venues here in
Houston, including the University of
Houston, Rice University that has a
biochemistry department and the Texas
Medical Center, which is a huge life science
research facility.

Here on campus -- I know the
situation best of all. We here -- in
nutrition, for example, Carl could possibly
have qualified for the positions open, and
there were positions open from time to time.
We just filled one, as a matter of fact, in
September of this year.

Then in addition, on campus, there
is a large Department of Biology that has
for the last five years had two and three
positions open every single year for the
past five years, the same for the Department
of Biochemistry, which merged into the
Department of Biology.

There is also the Department of
the College of Pharmacy, which just had
several positions over the last two years
and has hired people over the last two
years.

At the Medical Center, my
knowledge isn't as intimate. With a huge
place like that, with the representation of
biology and biochemistry and molecular
biology and all of the premedical fields,
there are certainly constantly positions
coming open and constantly positions are
being filled.

It was not only in my department
that I was interested in helping Carl, but
it was in all of the departments, all of the
relevant departments at the University of
Houston and relevant departments at the
Texas Medical Center. I think that about
sums it up.

Contrary to the holding of this Court, there were positions open when Bernofsky applied at the University of Houston. Also, there was a possible research position at Michigan Tech.

The "factual findings" of the Court (Order and Reasons, page 2, footnote 1) are inappropriate because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided for a jury trial for Title VII. This Court is not the fact finder in this case. Bernofsky has never been given his day in Court. A jury has never seen his evidence. Instead, this Court has made findings of fact instead of a jury as required by law. There are genuine issues of material facts in this case. Some of them are as follows:

Funding of the courts is a serious consideration in any type of life time employment/ position that is sought because it reflects expert opinion of a candidate's qualifications. Furthermore, statement by the President of the United States that a candidate impugns the honesty of that candidate and is ground for immediate rejection.

The statements in the Rosenbaum Orders were false. The Court glosses over the falsity of the statements by admitting they are technically inaccurate. There is an issue of fact whether the false statements were written with retaliatory animus. This is a jury issue.


The Federal Bench since 1973 damaged the reputation of Sharon, her family, associates,friends leading to Death,Disabilitys. Sharon has been reduced to poverty, completely ignored by the Court. and that was important to their reputations. Sharon was not asked about the litigation. She has forensic evidence with her pacer and ECF Accounts,that information voluntarily is submitted in Good Faith.

Sharon reurges, as if restated herein, her arguments stated in her Opposition to Summary Judgment.

WHEREFORE, Sharon requests that Judge James Rosenbaum recuse himself from this or any other case's, that he rescind all of his orders after Feb7,2002 or, in the alternative, that he amend his judgment to reinstate Sharons claims of retaliation and defamation.

Respectfully submitted, by E Commerce via Blogs www.sharon-mn-ecf.blogspot.com in Good Faith, not for delay, in compliance with the 14 day requirement,

Until the Issues of Bad Behavior of any Judge are address'ed the 8th Circuit 's unsigned "Order" is premature, invalid, unconstitutionally void.

s/ Sharon Anderson Sharon4Anderson@aol.com www.msnusers.com/AndersonAdvocates

Attorney Pro Se/Private AG

ssd: 475-36-5396

Legal Domicile 1058 Summit/PO Box 4384

St. Paul, MN 55104-0384


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that I have on this 7th day of March 2007 served a copy of the foregoing pleading on all counsel of record by e commerce the same by United States by CD Rom, over the weekend and by Fax to the US Attorney Office

s/s Sharon Anderson P 165913 sa1299


The Supreme Court in a Time of Transition http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0042-6601(192104)7%3A7%3C547%3ADOFJBO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M

Chicago Greylord Operations - Google Search Operation Greylord

FRCP - Rule 52 (LII 2004 ed.) 1. Case Fixing:FedCases_13 for 30 years of denials, covert coverups

Bank Fraud,SASC_1988_15, lower court Judges embellizzing,equity skimming, money laundering ,Title 18, SharonsRealestate_34, Deaths,Disabilitys , Murders of Property owners, taking DL by unlicensed cops, cops stalking www.sharonderson.org causing broken ankle medical bills over $20 thousand.WaterA06-1150f/_26

RepParty(Wersal) v. White_JudBoard Congressman F.James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Rosenbaum lied to Congress

2. 42 USC 3631 reducing the citizenery to poverty, "taking" without Just Compensation, mandates Federal Inquiry Title 31TITLE 31 Money_Finance Quitam and the Criminal Code to indict Federal Judge Rosenbaum who refuses to honor Affidavits of Prejudices $150Rcpt0332(Rosenbaum).jpg (image)

Olmstead v. US GovLawbreaker by stealing filing fees re: US Dist.02-0332 Sharon has been denied her property at 42741-321stpl(GunLake) Aitkin MN. for over 5 years, her Tenant Steve M. Quale Sr. was Murdered in the Sherburne Co. Jail 9Feb05

According to Congress, U.S. Supreme Court case law and Rhode Island's canons of judicial ethics, a judge must bow out of hearing any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The Rhode Island Canons of Judicial Conduct say that judges must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. "The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."

3.

Critiques of the Judiciary

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  • , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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    JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: CODES OF CONDUCT

    Becoming a Judge
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    The Dream of Justice
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    Judicial Inspector General
    A Veteran's Lament
    Juice & Justice in Vegas
    Becoming a Judge, Part 2

    The Scales of Justice
    The Imperial Judiciary
    A Veteran's Lament, Part 2
    A Veteran's Lament, Part 3
    The Finest Judges...
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    Without Merit...
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